We investigate whether the concept of guilt aversion in economics is related to the psychological characterization of the same phenomenon. For trust games and dictator games we report correlations between the guilt sensitivity measured within a framework of psychological games most common in economics and the guilt sensitivity measured using a questionnaire common in psychology (TOSCA-3). We find that the two measures correlate well and significantly in the two settings.
Introduction
In recent years there has been a growing interest among economists to better understand how emotions impact economic interactions. Many emotions in economics are modeled using psychological game theory and belief-dependent preferences (Geanakoplos, Pearce, and Stacchetti, 1989; Battigalli and Dufwenberg, 2009) . One of the belief-dependent preferences is guilt aversion. Guilt averse individuals trade off their own well-being on the other hand and how much they let down others on the other hand, with the latter depending on their belief regarding others' expectations (Charness and Dufwenberg, 2006; Battigalli and Dufwenberg, 2007) . Secondorder beliefs -what individuals think others expect from them -thus play a central role in the economic analysis of guilt aversion.
Psychologists have a longer tradition in studying guilt and guilt aversion. Like economists, they have highlighted the interpersonal nature of guilt. E.g. Baumeister, Stillwell, and Heatherton (1994) refers to guilt as a feeling of distress that arises whenever one has caused harm on to somebody else or has violated a moral standard. Next to this, however, guilt might also arise in reaction to a situation in which one feels having received more than deserved or violated a moral standard even 'when no one is harmed or disappointed or knows about the incident' (Baumeister, Stillwell, and Heatherton, 1994, p. 246-247) . Thus, notwithstanding its connection to the economic conceptualization, the psychological definition of guilt is broader as it more generally refers to an emotional state associated with the violation of an intrinsic moral standard. This moral standard may be related to the (expected) beliefs or outcomes of others, but not necessarily so. The psychological concept of guilt is often put in contrast to shame in that guilt may lead to the repair of the violation or a correction of future behavior whereas shame rather leads to withdrawal (see Tangney and Dearing, 2002 , for a discussion).
Unsurprisingly, very distinct measures of guilt sensitivity have been developed in economics and psychology. Economists focus on studying how people respond to second-order beliefs in specific choice settings (see Charness and Dufwenberg, 2006) . This research typically provides aggregate measures of guilt sensitivity for a given population. 2 The approach has re-cently been extended to measure guilt sensitivity at the individual level (see Khalmetski, Ockenfels, and Werner, 2015; Attanasi, Battigalli, and Nagel, 2017; Bellemare, Sebald, and Suetens, 2017) . Psychologists on the other hand have developed extensive questionnaires to measure guilt sensitivity at the individual level, including the Test of Self-Conscious Affect, hereafter TOSCA (Tangney, Dearing, Wagner, and Gramzow, 2000) . TOSCA presents respondents with a series of scenarios including six possible emotional reactions on a five-points Likert scale.
Feelings of guilt are one of these possible reactions, and the summation of the scale responses across all scenarios generates a measure of guilt sensitivity at the individual level. It remains an open question whether measures of guilt sensitivity developed in economics and psychology are at all related -the focus of our analysis.
Establishing a relationship between these two measures would lend wider credibility to the concept of guilt as defined in economics and provide new opportunities for the economic analysis of its socio-economic determinants. Measuring the economic concept of belief-dependent guilt sensitivity at the individual rather than the aggregate level offers direct information about its distribution in the population and thus more power to detect its correlates as compared to aggregate measurements. However, this approach is not always implementable because of the requirement to set up interactions between respondents as well as the need to measure the causal effect of higher-order beliefs. The psychological TOSCA measure on the other hand is simpler to implement in e.g. large representative samples because it does not involve interactions. If correlated, the latter can serve as a proxy for economic guilt sensitivity.
Our paper relates to Bracht and Regner (2013) (BR2013) , in which choices by trustees in a Trust game are regressed on a set of explanatory variables including self-reported secondorder beliefs and psychological measures of guilt aversion (TOSCA-3 and GASP). They find that these measures correlate significantly with choices in an intuitive way. Our study improves upon theirs in three respects. First, our dependent variable is economic guilt sensitivity at the individual level rather than the 'extent' of prosocial behavior (of trustees). The same extent of prosocial behavior can be hiding either a low guilt sensitivity combined with pro-social second-order beliefs or a high guilt sensitivity combined with less pro-social second-order beevidence that guilt sensitivity varies across the various socio-economic characteristics of relevant players.
liefs. Implicitly, the assumption in BR2013 is thus that economic guilt sensitivity is the same for all subjects. Neglected heterogeneity of economic guilt sensitivity (documented here) will likely be picked up by psychological measures of guilt aversion, exaggerating the effects of the latter. Second, in contrast to BR2013 our analysis does not suffer from possible endogeneity issues related to the self-reporting of second-order beliefs. Such a 'false consensus effect' is known to lead to an overestimation of the effect of second-order beliefs on choices in trust and related games (see Vanberg, 2008; Ellingsen, Johannesson, Tjötta, and Torsvik, 2010; Bellemare, Sebald, and Strobel, 2011; Bellemare, Sebald, and Suetens, 2017) . Third, even absent the first two problems, joint significance of second-order beliefs and psychological measures of guilt sensitivity as variables that explain pro-social behavior does not necessarily imply that economic and psychological guilt sensitivities are correlated.
In this paper we use data that allow to identify economic guilt sensitivity at the individual level controlling for possible false consensus effects. We use these data to assess correlation with a psychological measure of guilt sensitivity (TOSCA-3). We explore correlation both when economic guilt sensitivity is measured in a binary Trust game or a binary Dictator game. We find that the two measures are significantly correlated: Spearman rank correlations are well above 0.2 in absolute value, and statistically significant in both sets of experimental games. We also find that economic measures of guilt sensitivity do not correlate with other emotional dispositions covered by TOSCA-3 (such as proneness to shame, externalization, detachment, and pride), a further indication that TOSCA-3 is able to capture fundamental elements of economic guilt which are conceptually different than alternative emotions. This paper thus complements recent efforts by economists to validate survey measures of preferences by establishing correlation with experimental decisions (see e.g. Falk, Becker, Dohmen, Huffman, and Sunde, 2016) .
The organization of our paper is as follows. Section 2 presents our experimental design and procedures. Section 3 presents our experimental results. Section 4 concludes.
Methods and design
We use data from two experiments, namely a Trust game and a Dictator game, as well as data from a TOSCA-3 questionnaire that participants answered after completion of the games. The experimental data have been reported in our companion papers Bellemare, Sebald, and Suetens (2017) and Bellemare, Sebald, and Suetens (2018) . Bellemare, Sebald, and Suetens (2017) use data from the Trust and Dictator games and focus on comparing different methods of studying the effect of second-order beliefs on behavior. Bellemare, Sebald, and Suetens (2018) use data from the Dictator game with the purpose of studying the effect of stakes on guilt sensitivity.
We explain the decision-making part of the games in Section 2.1 and the elicitation of TOSCA-3 guilt proneness in Section 2.2. 3 Participants in the Dictator game played three consecutive binary dictator games. They were randomly allocated to the roles of player A and player B at the start of the experiment.
Economic approach to measure guilt sensitivity
We refer to the dictator as B and to the passive player as A. Participants in the role of B were asked to choose between playing Left and Right. In the first game, A and B earned respectively 48 and 50 points when B chose Left. A and B earned respectively 22 and 54 points when B chose
Right. In the two other games, all payoffs were multiplied by 2 and 4 respectively. 5 3 Notice that the experimental data we use in the current paper are from what we have referred to as the Menu treatments in Bellemare, Sebald, and Suetens (2017) . 4 The conversion rate was as follows: 10 points = 40 DKK (about five Euros).
5 Participants played the three dictator games in a random order and did not receive any feedback in between these decision situations. The instructions made clear that total payoff in experimental points would be equal to
The economic approach we used to measure guilt sensitivity in both games was the following. Participants in the role of A were asked to report their belief about B's choice; they were asked to indicate how many out of 10 B-players they believe will choose Left. In the case of the Trust game they were asked for the conditional first-order belief. Participants in the role of B were asked whether they would choose Left or Right for each of the 11 possible levels of belief of the matched A (see Figure A3 in the appendix). In the Trust game B was free to switch back and forth between both options for different levels of A's beliefs. In the Dictator game B was not allowed to switch back and forth but instead could switch at most once from Right to Left as beliefs of the matched A increased. 6 The choices of B were subsequently matched to the (first-order) belief of the matched A-players to determine the payoffs of both players. 7 We illustrate the identification of guilt sensitivity using the model of 'simple' guilt introduced by Charness and Dufwenberg (2006) and Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2007) 
. This condition implies that conditional on B's sensitivity to guilt θ, the second-order belief β plays a key role in determining whether B chooses Left or Right. Specifically, in case player B believes that A believes that no B-player chooses Left, there is neither guilt in choosing Left nor Right. As a consequence, given that π B L < π B R in our experiment, a guilt averse player B chooses Right irrespective of her guilt sensitivity θ. On the other hand, at a second-order belief β > 0, whether a guilt averse player B switches from Right to Left the sum of payoffs obtained across all games. The conversion rate was as follows: 10 points = 4 DKK (about half a Euro). Average earnings per hour were very similar to those in the Trust game. 6 The motivation to allow for just one switch in the Dictator game was that this experiment was designed to structurally estimate how guilt sensitivity depends on stakes in the context of the model of simple guilt of Charness and Dufwenberg (2006) and Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2007) (see our companion paper Bellemare, Sebald, and Suetens, 2018) . 7 As we show in Bellemare, Sebald, and Suetens (2017) , this elicitation method does not lead to significant differences in choices relative to a baseline treatment where second-order beliefs are self-reported. 8 In the Trust game β represents player B's conditional second-order belief, since B was asked to choose Le f t or Right conditional on player A choosing In. depends on θ.
, player B switches from Right to Left. Notice that the switch-point is decreasing in β. Finally, if player B's sensitivity to guilt θ <
, player B will always choose Right independent of the second-order belief β. In this case, player B's sensitivity to guilt is not strong enough to induce a switch from Right to Left in our game. Figure   1 presents for both games the identification regions of θ corresponding to the belief at which B switches from Right to Left. Note that identifications regions are insensitive to the three payoff scales used in the Dictator game experiment (see Bellemare, Sebald, and Suetens (2018) for more details).
Psychological approach to measure guilt sensitivity
Participants were asked to go through a questionnaire consisting of a slightly adjusted version of the TOSCA-3 questionnaire printed in Tangney and Dearing (2002) . The complete questionnaire used is presented in Section A.3 of the appendix. 9 The TOSCA-3 is standard in psychology and was developed to assess individuals' sensitivity to social emotions. It contains 16 com- 9 We slightly changed the choice of words in 5 out of the 16 scenarios in order to make the scenario appropriate for a student-based subject pool. For example, we replaced words like 'co-worker' and 'work' by 'other student' and 'student job' without changing the nature of the emotional experience. The modified questionnaire is available upon request. mon day-to-day scenarios drawn from written accounts of relevant experiences provided by a sample of college students and non-college adults (e.g., 'While out with a group of friends, you make fun of a friend who's not there.'). Each scenario is followed with item responses referring to separate emotions. Emotions considered include guilt, shame, detachment, externalization, and pride (see appendix A.3 for examples of item responses). For each item response, participants are asked to indicate on a 5-point scale the likelihood of responding in the indicated way, ranging from 0 (not sensitive) to 4 (highly sensitive). Measures of guilt sensitivity, shame proneness, externalization, pride, and detachment are respectively computed by summing together reported scales across all item responses specific to the emotion. All of the 16 scenarios have item responses that qualify for guilt-proneness, shame-proneness, and externalization. Other responses qualify for detachment (in 11 out of the 16 scenarios), and pride (in the remaining 5). Our psychological measures of guilt sensitivity, shame sensitivity, and externalization thus range from 0 to 64. The measure of detachment ranges from 0 to 44, while the measure of pride ranges from 0 to 20. Our analysis will correlate each of the emotions measured using the TOSCA questionnaire with the economic measure of guilt sensitivity.
In the introduction we mentioned that the psychological definition of guilt is somewhat broader than the economic definition. It not only refers to feelings of distress that arise in interpersonal relations whenever one feels that one has caused harm on to somebody else or is in the wrong but can also arise in reaction to e.g. positive inequity or when one feels to have violated some moral standard even 'when no one is harmed or disappointed and no one knows about the incident'. This might broadly suggest that a division of the TOSCA scenarios could be relevant depending on whether somebody else is harmed or let down as a consequence of one's action. Roughly speaking it seems that scenarios 1, 3, 5, 7, 9, 12, 13, 15 and 16 involve a possible harm inflicted on somebody else or a potential let down of somebody else. All other scenarios seem to relate more to issues concerning positive inequity or the violation of an internal moral standard.
Experimental procedures
The Trust game was run in May 2011 while the Dictator game was run in February and September 2012. Both experiments were conducted in the Laboratory of the Center of Experimental Economics at the University of Copenhagen. The experiments were programmed in z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) and participants were recruited through ORSEE (Greiner, 2015) . The Trust and Dictator games had 42 and 142 participants respectively in the role of player B. 10 At the beginning of a session participants were randomly allocated to a computer terminal. Once seated, they received instructions explaining they were matched in pairs and that they were randomly allocated to one of the roles. Instructions can be found in Sections A.1 and A.2 of the appendix.
Upon completing the experiment and the TOSCA-3 questionnaire, participants were informed of their payoffs, completed a short post-experimental questionnaire, were paid and dismissed.
Finally, we note that one may argue that having subjects complete the TOSCA-3 questionnaire right after the elicitation of the choices in the experiment may raise concerns of possible spurious correlations between the two measures due to subjects' wish to be consistent (see e.g. Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, and Podsakoff, 2003) . However, given that the two tasks are of a very different nature it not obvious at all for laymen what it means to be consistent. 11
Results

Descriptive statistics
The economic approach allows to bound guilt sensitivity for B-players who switch at most once from playing Right to playing Left as second-order beliefs increased. 32 out of 42 B-players in the Trust game and, by design, all B-players in the Dictator game satisfy this requirement. 12 Our economic measure of guilt sensitivity is given by the switch-point defined as the belief at Regarding TOSCA-3 guilt proneness, we find a Cronbach's alpha of 0.645 for the Trust game and 0.749 for the Dictator game, and of 0.725 for the merged sample. The internal consistency of the answers related to guilt proneness in the Trust game is lower than in the Dictator game.
However, the bootstrapped 95% confidence interval for alpha is (0.565, 0.767) for the Trust 13 Bellemare, Sebald, and Suetens (2018) provide a detailed analysis of the distribution of switch-points in the Dictator game experiment for all three stake levels. Distributions are not significantly different between the first two payoff scales, while distributions for the lowest and highest payoff scales are significantly different, consistent with diminishing guilt sensitivity. game and (0.696, 0.838) for the Dictator game, so that the null that alpha is equal to 0.7 is rejected for neither of the two settings (see Padilla, Divers, and Newton, 2012, for details on the bootstrap procedure). This leads us to conclude that internal consistency is sufficiently strong in both settings. The observation that the confidence interval for the Trust game is wider than for the Dictator game reflects the relatively lower sample size. There are no clear differences between the two distributions. We find that average guilt sensitivity of B-players is 46.4 in the Trust game and 45.9 in the Dictator game (p = 0.845 in a Mann-Whitney-U test). This suggest that TOSCA-3 guilt sensitivity is robust to the nature of economic decision-making that took place beforehand. These results combined with the overlap on confidence intervals for Cronbach's alpha support pooling data from both games. Table 1 reports for both experiments Spearman rank correlations between guilt sensitivities measured using the two approaches as well as associated p-values (in parentheses). Correlation between measures is -0.33 and -0.25 in the Trust game and Dictator game respectively and statistically significant (p = 0.067 and p = 0.003 respectively). The interpretation is that a higher economic guilt sensitivity in the experiment -a lower switch-point -is associated with a higher score on the TOSCA-3 guilt sensitivity scale. Note that the rank correlations for the three stake levels separately are -0.148 (p = 0.081), -0.213 (p = 0.011) and -0.219 (p = 0.009) for low, middle and high stakes respectively. The games with higher stakes thus correlate best with the TOSCA-3 score.
Correlations
One might be tempted to see the correlations relative to a perfect correlation of 1 or -1.
However, such a perfect correlation can only be obtained if there would not be any measurement error, which is obviously not realistic (see Falk et al., 2016 , for a discussion in the context of other preferences). Thus, due to measurement error, the maximum possible correlation between our measure for economic guilt sensitivity and the TOSCA-3 guilt aversion score would be lower than one even if the latter would measure guilt sensitivity equally well as the eco- A further result is that correlations between our economic measure of guilt sensitivity and other emotional dispositions identified in the TOSCA-3 are much smaller in absolute value, not robust across the two experiments, and not statistically significant (see Table A1 in the appendix). This squares well with the result of Bracht and Regner (2013) that trustworthiness in a Trust game correlates significantly with guilt proneness but not shame proneness, both of which were elicited in a separate questionnaire. The results overall suggest that the TOSCA-3 measure of guilt aversion may serve as a valid proxy for economic guilt sensitivity.
We next analyze whether a smaller subset of TOSCA-3 scenarios better correlates with economic guilt sensitivity. This exercise is useful if searching for a proxy for economic guilt sensitivity in settings where TOSCA-3 is available and economic measures are not. We measure the subset of TOSCA-3 questions which has the highest power of predicting economic guilt sensitivity based on the leaps and bounds approach proposed by Furnival and Wilson (1974) .
In our context, the leaps and bounds approach covers the space of all possible combinations of TOSCA-3 scenarios (predictors), while avoiding obvious inferior subsets and thus the need to compute the predictive power of all possible combinations of scenarios. The implementation of the leaps and bounds algorithm is based on the linear regression of the economic guilt sensitivity measure (the switch-point) on each scenario's guilt-proneness item response scale (0 to 4). For a given number of k predictors, the algorithm can be shown to select the best k scenarios from those available in order to minimize the residual sum of squares of the regression (see Lindsey and Sheather, 2010, for further references). Our analysis pools data from both dictator and trust games, controlling for differences across games using a binary variable separating data from each game of which the effect is kept constant throughout the algorithm. 14 Table 2 gives an overview of the three best-predicting scenarios (numbered) and corresponding guilt proneness item responses (lettered) across the Dictator game and Trust game experiment. We find that 11e -corresponding to scenario 11 and item response e -is the best individual predictor of economic guilt sensitivity. The best set of two predictors contains 11e and 9d, while the best set of three predictors contains 11e, 9d and 5d. Table A2 in the appendix presents the full range of best subsets of TOSCA-3 scenarios retrieved from the algorithm along with model selection statistics, including Akaike, the Bayesian Information Criteria, and ad- 14 The algorithm is implemented using the vselect command in Stata (see Lindsey and Sheather, 2010) . 5 'You make a mistake at your student job and find out a coworker is blamed for the error.' item d 'You would feel unhappy and eager to correct the situation.'
Notes: TOSCA-3 scenarios (numbered) and corresponding guilt proneness item responses (lettered) derived using the leaps and bounds algorithm. See Section A.3 of the appendix for the full TOSCA-3 including all items.
justed R 2 . Model selection statistics provide guidance on the predictive power of each subset of scenarios. AIC, AICC, and BIC model selection statistics prefer subsets with either 2 or 3 scenarios. Model selection based on adjusted R 2 points towards a larger subset of 7 scenarios.
However, the change in adjusted R 2 from 2 scenarios to 7 scenarios is rather small.
Finally, Table 3 presents rank correlations between the economic measure of guilt sensitivity (the switch-points) and guilt sensitivity computed using the three smallest subsets of scenarios presented in Table A2 . The latter are computed by summing the guilt proneness item response scale of each scenario (ranging from 0 to 4) in a given subset, similar to the way the overall TOSCA-3 measure is computed. We find that correlations between guilt sensitivities based on the best subset of three scenarios and switch-points are -0.398 in the Trust game, and -0.323 in the Dictator game. Both correlations are higher in absolute value than the corresponding correlations computed using all 16 TOSCA-3 scenarios (the latter were -0.328 and -0.233 respectively, see Table 1 ). Moreover, the best or two best scenarios also correlate well with the economic measure of guilt sensitivity.
Conclusion
Economists and psychologists have developed separate measures of guilt sensitivity based on fundamentally different approaches to model and capture guilt aversion. Economists ap- Notes: Spearman rank correlations (and p-values) between switch points and guilt sensitivity measured using subsets of TOSCA-3 scenarios. TOSCA-3 scenarios (numbered) and corresponding guilt proneness item responses (lettered) derived using the leaps and bounds algorithm.
proach guilt aversion using mathematical models firmly grounded in psychological game theory where higher-order beliefs are central to determine the extent to which individuals are averse to letting down others. The TOSCA questionnaire used in psychology, on the other hand, is not grounded in a specific behavioral model anchored on beliefs, yet is able to capture guilt aversion using self-reported feelings of guilt in the context of a range of day-to-day scenarios.
Our results show that guilt sensitivity elicited in the context of the model of simple guilt by Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2007) is fundamentally related to the TOSCA-3 measure of guilt sensitivity, and unrelated to other emotional dispositions measured using TOSCA-3. The correlation with TOSCA-3 guilt sensitivity is in absolute value equal to 0.33 in the Trust game and to 0.25 in the Dictator games (statistically significant at the 10% and 1% level respectively).
These correlations are not just statistically significant but also substantial in size, in particular if compared to the correlations between three measures for economic guilt sensitivity elicited in three subsequent Dictator games that are the same in terms of the incentive to avoid guilt.
The result is good news for economists because it gives credit to a rigorous approach to guilt and guilt aversion.
This paper further identifies a small subset of TOSCA-3 which can be used to construct a simpler and better predictor of economic measures of guilt sensitivity, which fits well with recent efforts to validate simple and short survey measures of preferences by establishing correlation with experimental decisions (see e.g. Falk et al., 2016 Falk et al., , 2018 You are participating in an experiment on economic decision making and will be asked to make a number of decisions. Please follow the instructions carefully. At the end of the experiment, you will be paid your earnings in private and in cash.
You are not allowed to communicate with other participants. If you have a question, raise your hand and one of us will help you.
The experiment is strictly anonymous: that is, your identity will not be revealed to others and the identity of others will not be revealed to you.
Payoffs in the experiment are specified in points. At the end of the experiment the points will be exchanged into DKK at the following exchange rate: 10 points = 40 DKK
A.1.2 Instructions player A
In the experiment, participants are divided into pairs. In each pair, one participant is randomly assigned to the role of "player A", and the other participant to the role of "player B". Your role will be player A.
The experiment is connected to the following decision situation:
Choice of player A: In relation to the decision situation above, you will be asked the following two questions:
• What do you choose, IN or OUT?
• We call the answer to the first question your choice and the answer to the second question your belief.
Choice of player B: player B will be asked the following questions, supposing that you chooses
IN:
• What do you choose, LEFT or RIGHT?
• At the end of the experiment you and player B will be paid according to what you both answered to the questions.
A.1.3 Instructions player B
In the experiment, participants are divided into pairs. In each pair, one participant is randomly assigned to the role of "player A", and the other participant to the role of "player B". Your role will be player B.
[ Figure A1 is shown]
Choice of player A: In relation to the decision situation above, player A will be asked the following two questions:
• • ...
• ...
• 
A.2 Instructions Experiment 2 A.2.1 General part
You are participating in an experiment on economic decision making and will be asked to make a number of decisions. Please follow the instructions carefully. At the end of the experiment, you will be paid your earnings in private and in cash. You are not allowed to communicate with other participants. If you have a question, raise your hand and one of us will help you.
Payoffs in the experiment are specified in points. At the end of the experiment the points will be exchanged into DKK at the following exchange rate: 10 points = 4 DKK.
In the experiment, participants are divided into pairs. In each pair, one participant is randomly assigned to the role of "player A", and the other participant to the role of "player B".
A.2.2 Instructions player A
Your role will be player A.
In the experiment you will be confronted with a number of decision situations like the following: That is, player B will get the chance to decide between LEFT and RIGHT. The only difference between the decision situation depicted above (in Figure 1 ) and the situations you will be confronted with during the experiment are the payoffs connected to player B's choices LEFT and
RIGHT.
What are the decisions that have to be taken during the experiment?
Choice of player A: In each decision situation that you will be confronted with, you will be asked the following question:
• Out of 10 B-players, how many do you believe will choose LEFT?
We call the answer to this question your belief.
Choice of player B: player B will be asked to choose LEFT or RIGHT.
How are payoffs calculated?
Assume that you are confronted with the decision situation as shown in Figure 1 At the end of the experiment the payoffs from the different decision situations will be summed and you and player B will be paid accordingly.
Following these decisions there will be a questionnaire.
A.2.3 Instructions player B
Your role will be player B.
In the experiment you will be confronted with a number of decision situations like the following:
[ Figure A2 is shown] That is, you will get the chance to decide between LEFT and RIGHT. The only difference between the decision situation depicted above (in Figure 1 ) and the situations you will be confronted with during the experiment are the payoffs connected to your choices LEFT and RIGHT.
What are the decisions that have to be taken during the experiment?
Choice of player A: In each decision situation, player A is informed that you can choose LEFT or RIGHT, and about the payoffs connected to these choices. player A will be asked the following question: Out of 10 B-players, how many do you believe will choose LEFT?
We call the answer to this question player A's belief.
Choice of player B:
You will be asked to choose LEFT or RIGHT. More specifically, you will be asked the following questions: • ...
• ... At the end of the experiment the payoffs from the different decision situations will be summed and player A and you will be paid accordingly.
A.3 The Test of Self-Conscious Affect (TOSCA-3)
Instructions
Below are situations that people are likely to encounter in day-to-day life, followed by several common reactions to those situations.
As you read each scenario, try to imagine yourself in that situation. Then indicate how likely you would be to react in each of the ways described. We ask you to rate all responses because people may feel or react more than one way to the same situation, or they may react different ways at different times. In the above example, I've rated all of the answers by circling a number. I circled a "1" for answer (a) because I wouldn't want to wake up a friend very early on a Saturday morning -so it's not at all likely that I would do that. I circled a "5" for answer (b) because I almost always read the paper if I have time in the morning (very likely). I circled a "3" for answer (c) because for me it's about half and half. Sometimes I wouldn't -it would depend on what I had planned. And I circled a "4" for answer (d) because I would probably wonder why I had awakened so early.
Please do not skip any items -rate all responses. 
Interpretation
The TOSCA-3 is composed of 11 negative and 5 positive scenarios yielding indices of Shame-Proneness, Guilt-Proneness, Externalization, Detachment/Unconcern. Alpha Pride, and Beta Pride. The scale scores are the sum of responses to relevant items (e.g., the score for the Shame scale equals the respondent's answer to 1a, plus the answer to 2b, etc.). The scoring for the TOSCA-3 is as follows: 
A.5 Supplementary tables
